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van den Haag: Punitive Sentences

PUNITIVE SENTENCES
Ernest van den Haag*

Deterrence is the sole purpose of threats of punishment.'
Therefore, in prescribing sentences, there is no need to consider

either desert (retribution) or rehabilitation. Sentences should be
determinate and legislatively prescribed, since the deterrent effect

is independent of the personality of the offender and of individual
circumstances. At present, several contradictory criteria-such as

desert, rehabilitation, and deterrence-must be compounded by
judges and parole boards. This produces chaotic inconsistencies,
many of which can be avoided when deterrence (apart from inca-

pacitation) is recognized as the exclusive purpose of sentencing.
Philosophical problems connected with retribution and rehabilita-

tion can be avoided as well.
THE DETERRENT PURPOSE OF LEGAL THREATS

The criminal law tries to influence future conduct by threatening to punish persons who do what it prohibits, so as to deter them
from doing it. Deterrence is the sole purpose of threatening
punishment. 2 Would-be offenders see the threats of the criminal
law as dangers. Most people respond to dangers, be they natural or
* Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law School. Studied: 1933-35, University
of Naples; 1935-37, University of Florence; 1937-39, Sorbonne. M.A., 1942, University of Iowa; Ph.D., 1952, New York University.
1. Incapacitation will be dealt with separately. See text following note 17 infra.
2. General deterrence-the attempt to restrain people from unlawful acts by
threatening to punish them-is distinguished from "special deterrence"-the expected
restraining effect of actual punishment on offenders. General deterrence refers to the
effect of potential punishment on potential offenders, the public at large, whereas
"special deterrence" refers to the effects of actual punishment (e.g., confinement) on
the future conduct of actual offenders. This distinction is useful. However, "special
deterrence" is indistinguishable from rehabilitation. When successful, the effect of
either is future lawful conduct of the offender; when unsuccessful, recidivism. (The
ingredients of rehabilitation and of "special deterrence" differ only slightly. Similar
disincentives and incentives are involved, with the latter stressed in rehabilitation.)
Since the detectable effects of rehabilitation coincide with those of "special deterrence," one of the two terms is redundant. Hence "special deterrence," so often confused with general deterrence, can be dropped and replaced by "rehabilitation,"
without loss to anyone but writers who like to make distinctions where there is no
difference. In the rest of this Article, nonrecidivism of released offenders is referred
to as rehabilitation.
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legal, by adapting their behavior to minimize risks. Otherwise, the
survival of the human race would be hard to explain. Hence, all
systems of punishment rest on the justified belief that, ceteris paribus, more severe or frequent punishment-greater danger-deters
more. Yet no legal threat, no matter how great the danger it produces, can deter everybody. Responsiveness varies: A few people are
altogether unresponsive to danger. Many more are not deterred
because the dangers attending legal threats are not great enough
to deter them. Such people might respond to more severe threats,
or to threats more likely to be carried out. Accordingly, to reduce
the crime rate, the severity of threatened punishment can be increased and it can be carried out more frequently. But even an unlimited increase of severity and frequency of punishment cannot
eliminate all offenses, since historically no Western3 system of
criminal justice has been able to catch and convict4 more than a
small proportion of all those threatened 5 -although we need not
make it as hard to catch and convict them as we do. Judicial interpretations of the Constitution have led to the creation and extension of the exclusionary rule and to some absurd probable cause
decisions. 6
3. Japan has lower (and declining) crime rates, and far higher apprehension and
conviction rates than any Western country. See C. CLIFFORD, CRIME CONTROL IN
JAPAN (1976). Japan not only has fewer criminals per capita than any Western country, it also has far fewer lawyers. Id. I cannot say whether there is a causal connection behind this statistical association; or behind the fact that the United States has
greatly increased its production of lawyers and of criminals.
4. Police may arrest offenders even when the evidence is insufficient for a lawful arrest (e.g., when probable cause is not demonstrable). And police may make
arrests when the admissible evidence is obviously insufficient for conviction. Police
officers tend to be cr6dited and promoted according to arrests made, not according to
convictions obtained.
However, because such arrests lead nowhere, prosecutors usually release the
suspects before arraignment; if not, they are released upon arraignment. One may
refer to the released persons as apprehended but not convicted, or as not apprehended. One must make a similar semantic decision about offenders released, or
not even arrested, because the police officer to whom the complaint was made anticipates witnesses and victims to be too fearful or unwilling to testify, or to be likely
to lose their resolution after a series of adjournments, or after threats by the suspect's
friends.
5. In a well-organized system, the chances of repeat offenders being caught and
convicted are comparatively high, since they become known to law enforcement
agencies and multiply their risks. But habitual offenders usually are not deterred,
and perhaps not deterrable, by available threats. However, actual punishment can
prevent additional offenses of recidivists by incapacitating them. Accordingly, incapacitation is suggested. See text following note 17 infra.
6. See Van den Haag, The Growth of the Imperial Judiciary, POL'Y REv.,
Spring 1978, at 62-63 (discussing United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of fourth amendment)).
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THREAT SIZE, FREQUENCY OF PUNISHMENT,
JUSTICE, AND DETERRENCE

Increases in the severity of threats and in the frequency with
which they are carried out usually are limited by considerations of
justice, which impose restrictions of two kinds:
(1) Rules instituted to protect nonoffenders and to restrain law
enforcers protect many offenders from apprehension and conviction
because insufficient evidence becomes available and admissible
under these rules. 7 Hence legal threats are not carried out often
enough to deter those offenders who might respond if threats of
punishment were more frequently carried out.
(2) Although the only purpose of threatening punishment is to
deter potential offenders, an attempt is also made to "do justice":
to proportion the size of each threatened punishment to the perceived gravity of the offense and to other threats that are so proportioned. However, the threat size required to successfully deter
from an offense does not depend on its gravity but on its attractiveness to prospective offenders. Whenever the attractiveness of
the offense exceeds its perceived gravity, threats, the sizes of
which are proportioned to the gravity of the offense, are unlikely to
deter those who might respond only to more severe threats, proportioned to the crime's attractiveness.
"Gravity" roughly equals the malevolently intended harm done.
(Permit me to neglect neglect and recklessness here.) Gravity is
an uneasy compound of disparate ingredients, since the degree
of wrongful intention, or of any culpability, may be independent
of the harm done and the two are not commensurable. However,
this compound often coincides with the perceived need for deterrence from the offense, although that need depends exclusively
on the harm the offense might do. Because both depend heavily
on harm done, gravity and the need for deterrence often coincide. Thus, both the gravity of, and the need to deter from, pickpocketing or parking violations are thought to be minor. Hence
the size of the threat is small and hardly deterrent since it does not
offset the attractiveness of the offense. The threat against murder is
severe because the offense is considered grave and the need to
deter great enough to maximize the threat size.
When the two criteria which determine the size of legal
threats yield different sizes, the severity required by the need for
7. These rules range from the requirement of jury unanimity to the exclusionary rule and the requirement of probable cause.
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deterrence from the offense may exceed the severity required by
the gravity of it. In Adam Smith's example of the sentry who is
executed for falling asleep, the gravity of the offense is perceived as
minor, the need to deter from it as major." The need to deter
prevails and this leads to a harshness Smith laments as necessary
but unjust. Often, however, when deterrence requires harshness
and gravity does not, gravity prevails as criterion and we threaten
but mild punishment. Our mild threats against drunken drivers
who do harm-for that matter against any drunks who do harmmay be just, considering the lack of malevolent intent, but they
certainly do not satisfy the need for deterrence. Nor do our threats
against juvenile offenders. Justice to potential offenders hereproportioned to their culpability-often involves injustice to potential victims, many of whom might be spared by more deterrent
threats.
FROM THREATS TO PUNISHMENT:

Is

RETRIBUTION IMPLIED?

Whatever its additional purposes, punishment carries out legal
threats which have failed to deter. Punishment thus seems necessarily retributive since, unlike a threat, punishment refers to past
offenses. Courts ascertain who has incurred guilt in the past and
punish him accordingly. Even the most ardent rehabilitationists
and deterrence theorists usually concede that a just distribution of
punishments, a distribution according to guilt, can be explained
only by resorting to concepts of retribution and desert. 9
I have been inclined to this view myself. But I have now concluded that the concept of retribution, which bases punishment on
what is deserved by guilt, is not needed to explain or justify the
distribution of punishments, or even the size of threats. Specifically, retributionist theories are not needed to tell us (a) why we
threaten, (b) why we punish, (c) why we punish only the guilty,
and (d) why we threaten or punish them to the degree to which we
do. According to Occam's razor--essentia non sunt multiplicanda
8.

ADAM SMITH'S MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

129-30 (H. Schneider

ed. 1970).
9. This is why rehabilitationists regard punishment according to guilt with misgivings. They would prefer a medical model, which makes guilt and justice irrelevant, substituting social and individual "needs for treatment" and dealing with crime
as one deals with hepatitis. For a discussion of the medical and legal models, see E.
VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL
QUESTION 117-23, 184-91 (1975).
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praeter necessitatem (concepts should not be multiplied beyond
need)-retributionist theories are not needed within any legal (as
distinguished from moral) discourse. The social need for deterrence
alone can be shown to justify and to limit the size of penalties and
their distribution exclusively to the guilty.
We threaten to punish only to deter; we do punish only because threats must be carried out. If legal threats are not carried
out they will not remain credible and will thus become ineffective
as deterrents. The deterrent purpose of legal threats, would be defeated. If not carried out, legal threats also would deceive the
lawabiding public which relies on the promise that law breakers
will be punished. 0 To the Roman nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without a law threatening it), we must add nulla lex
sine poena (no law without punishment as threatened).
If punishment is not retribution for guilt, why not punish the
innocent? The reason is simple: It is not deterrent to threaten or
punish those who are not believed to have violated the law.
Punishing the innocent may be as deterrent as punishing the
guilty, but only if the innocent are believed guilty. However, that
belief is hard to produce unless we do our best to single out the
guilty for punishment." Thus if we want to deter possible offenders, we must threaten those who might incur guilt, and, as
threatened, punish only those who have.
Since the deterrent effect is produced by perceived and not
necessarily by actual guilt, it can be argued that it would be deterrent to punish suspects believed to be guilty, as long as only authorities, such as courts, know them to be innocent. Moral (retributionist) objections cause revulsion at this thought: punishment
is morally justified only when deserved-when the person
punished has committed a blameworthy act. This moral argument,
whatever its merits, is not needed. The deterrence criterion also
10. The legal threat is an obligation not to the person threatened, who is
merely the object of the threat, but to those who rely on it, i.e., to lawabiding citizens. In view of the threat they omit actions they might have otherwise undertaken:
(1) They did not protect themselves from harm caused by the crime, at least not to
the degree they would have in the absence of the legal threat of punishment; nor did
they directly exact vengeance or compensation from those who caused it; (2) they did
refrain from unlawful actions, which they might have undertaken but for the threats
of the law. Unless threats are carried out, the lawabiding are placed at an unwarranted disadvantage.
11. "Our best" depends on the state of the art. It may involve witch doctors-if
that is the best we can do-or lawyers and courts if that is. But it must be believed to
be the best we can do.
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requires and permits only the punishment of guilty persons. Anyone who is punished as guilty, while known by the authorities to
be innocent, may subsequently become publicly known to have
been innocent. In addition, it may become known that the authorities knowingly allowed an innocent person to be punished. Indeed, there is a high risk that this will occur. If it does, it would
undermine the deterrent effectiveness of distributing punishment
only to the guilty as well as confidence in the authorities distributing the punishment. 12 Hence, from a purely deterrent viewpoint,
there is sufficient reason-apart from morality-not to punish anybody who can become known to be innocent. There is no need to
resort to retributive arguments. Moreover, the price of the virtues
of retributionism-simplicity and intuitive appeal-is high. Since
they bear no relation to social needs, criteria of desert tend to be
abandoned wherever the punishment deserved and the punishment
needed for deterrent purposes clash; 13 further, appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding, retributionism cannot tell what penalty
size is just. 1 4 Above all, to say that a penalty is deserved by the
gravity of an offense is to express a feeling-more or less widely
shared-rather than to give a reason. In contrast, deterrence is, in
principle and in fact, a measurable quantity. It prescribes sentences determined by expected and measurable social effects.
It is sometimes argued that the deterrence argument could
permit altogether different objects of punishment: for example, we
could threaten to punish the children or wives of the guilty. But
there is no deterrent advantage in such injustice. Guilt would still
have to be ascertained, and a direct threat against the guilty would
be more deterrent.
DESERT, GRAVITY, AND THREAT SIZE

Together with the need for deterrence, the gravity of the offense determines the size of threats and of actual punishments. The
gravity of an offense depends on the moral or material harm it does
and on the culpability of the offender. 15 The harm, it is thought,
12. The gospels present a remarkable case in point: Jesus, found guilty by a
court, later was thought innocent by his followers. A modem example is the Dreyfus
case which shook the French Republic when it emerged that a French Army officer,
convicted of espionage, was not only innocent, but had been deliberately used as a
scapegoat.
13. See text following note 8 supra.
14. See E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 9, at 191-95.
15. Harm often is morally evaluated. The relative gravity of rape and burglary
is rated morally. This moral evaluation determines the felt need for deterrence which
determines the threat size independently of desert.
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gives rise to the need for deterrence, while malevolent intent, culpability of any type, usually is thought to codetermine the size of
the punishment deserved. Thus, threats proportioned to the gravity of offenses are thought to be proportioned according to desert.
However, it is quite possible to allow culpability to codetermine
the size of threats and punishments because of its importance in
their deterrent function, and to dispense with notions of desert and
of retributive justice here too.
Culpability is a measure of guilt. The more offenders wrongfully intend to do harm the more guilty they are. Ceteris paribus,
threats are more deterrent the more specifically they are directed
to, and carried out against, those guilty of breaking the law. Thus,
if the harm produced by the offense is held constant, it will be
most deterrent to threaten and punish most severely the offenders
whose culpability is greatest, since only those culpably intending to
commit offenses can be deterred by the threats that punishment
makes effective. Therefore, a deterrent threat must take account
not just of the harmfulness of the offense, but also of the degree of
culpability of the offender. Justice must be done for the sake of
being deterrent as much as for the sake of being just.
Unfortunately, whether one wishes to maximize deterrence or
justice according to desert, the difficulties of compounding culpability and harmfulness remain. The deterrence criterion, based on
harm and culpability, still may lead to ineffective threat sizes whenever the attractiveness of the offense is great and the harm it does
is not. In such cases the wrongful intent does not weigh heavily
because of the comparative harmlessness of the offense. On the
other hand, threat sizes above those justified by culpability are
likely whenever the need for deterrence is thought overwhelmingly
great because of the harm done. In such cases the fact that there is
little or no wrongful intent is disregarded because of the harmfulness of the offense. This may offend our sense of justice; indeed,
strict liability does. It is acceptable, nevertheless, because the deterrent threat can be effective in some types of offenses, even
without a showing of individual culpability-although, almost by
definition, the punishment inflicted is undeserved.
INTUITION AND THE ROLE OF DESERT

Intuitively, it seems inappropriate to deny a role to retribution
and desert in the theory of punishment. These concepts are indeed
essential to moral theories which help explain why the community
prohibits or should prohibit certain actions as wrong. Moral
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theories also help explain the amount of harm done by prohibited
actions and, therefore, the intensity of the need to deter them.
Further, moral theories influence the rules of evidence and procedure, vAhich protect individual rights (e.g., privacy) and limit punishment threats (e.g., by prohibiting punitive torture). But the
belief that moral concepts such as desert and retribution must play
a role in the theory of punishment itself is mistaken. It rests on an
insufficient distinction between moral theories and theories of
punishment. 16 Indeed, if one takes as datum that whatever the law
prohibits is harmful, concepts such as desert are not needed in the
theories of punishment which explain who is threatened and
punished, why, and how much. The need to deter entirely explains
the size and distribution of threats and punishment.
PUNISHMENT AND THE FUTURE

If an act for which a reward was promised has been done, the
promised reward must be given, regardless of how the person to
whom the promise was made is likely to behave in the future. Future conduct is relevant only to future promises and rewards.
Analogously, a threatened punishment must be carried out independently of the future conduct of the person against whom it was
threatened. Future conduct is relevant only to future threats and
punishments. Punishment, then, need not rest on anything but
past threats; and it cannot rest on the desire for rehabilitation or
incapacitation both of which refer only to future conduct. Both may
coincide with punishment; but they also may be separately produced; and punishment need not produce either. Thus, however
useful punishment is in rehabilitating or incapacitating, neither is
logically related to punishment's essential function: to deter from
crime.
Since punitive sentences carry out legal threats made beforehand, they must be determined by the threat made against the
offenses committed and not by conjectures about the future behavior of the offender. However, past offenses (and additional objective factors) may predict the likelihood of future offenses. If that
likelihood is great enough, threats and sentences may include provisions for nonpunitive incapacitation for the sake of social defense.
16.

Moral theories are theories of right and wrong, good and bad, etc. Theories

of punishment deal with social devices to control what moral theory tells us to control. Punishment and the threat of punishment are more or less effective means of
social control, means used to accomplish the (moral) ends incorporated in the law.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss1/7

8

19781

PUNITIVE SENTENCES

van den Haag: Punitive Sentences

REHABILITATION

Although rehabilitation is incidental to punishment, punishment usually is essential to rehabilitation. Without punishment rehabilitation is unlikely to take place, for it is the experience of
punishment, and the threat of future punishments, that suggests to
offenders that their criminal conduct is self-defeating; punishment
gives them the main motive for rehabilitation. In the absence of
such a motive, rehabilitation cannot be helped by any program of
treatment.' 7 Punishment and the threat of punishment may not be
sufficient but are necessary ingredients for rehabilitation. On the
other hand, that an offender has been rehabilitated is neither
a necessary nor sufficient justification to stop a punishment inflicted
to carry out a threat against an offense committed in the past.
INCAPACITATION

Confinement is not essential to punishment, since punishment
may consist of a fine. Nor is punishment essential to confinement,
which may be imposed for nonpunitive reasons on the insane, on
those suffering from infectious diseases, or on those held for trial.
Punishment is thus not a necessary reason for incapacitation, although it is a sufficient one. Incapacitation is felt to be punitive,
because it is involuntary. Still, incapacitation need not be punitive
in function.
Whereas punishment is threatened to deter, and imposed because threatened, incapacitation may be imposed for reasons that
have nothing to do with deterrence. If we knew, by revelation,
that a man would throw a bomb to harm the community, we certainly would incapacitate him for as long as we knew him to be
willing and capable of throwing the bomb, regardless of whether
his intent is criminal or his mind deranged. By incapacitating him
we do not intend to punish him: he has done nothing, as yet, to
justify punishment. We cannot punish anyone for what he has not
yet done.' 8 We can incapacitate him, however, to prevent harm.
Incapacitation, then, is a measure of preemptive social defense,
quite independent of punishment.
17. No program of treatment has been shown to regularly and significantly increase the rate of rehabilitation (defined as nonrecidivism) of treated over nontreated control groups. See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975).

18. Here, the deterrent and retributive conclusions coincide, although the arguments for each differ. However, incapacitation is independent of either argument.
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Now, in practice, certainty about what anyone will do is hard
to come by. However, we have statistical probabilities which may
vary from offender to offender and can be calculated. They indicate
that those convicted of a second offense, particularly if young, are
much more likely to commit other offenses than those who are not,
and those convicted of a third offense are still more likely to continue criminal conduct. It is also statistically likely that those convicted of second and third offenses have already committed many
more offenses of which they were not convicted. 19
There is no reason why the punishment threatened for committing a second offense should not exceed that threatened for the
first. The community may wish to deter not only from specific offenses, but also from continued offending. And, quite apart from
punishment, the community may rely on offenses committed, combined with other relevant factors, to statistically predict the likelihood of further offenses. Where such likelihood is found to be
considerable and to significantly exceed the average likelihood of
future offenses by nonconvicts, the convict likely to commit further offenses of sufficient harmfulness should be incapacitated for
as long as that likelihood remains high. This may lead to postpunishment incapacitation of some young recidivists up to the age
of forty. Some older recidivists may be incapacitated up to the age
of fifty, if our data relating age and likelihood of criminality are correct.

20

There are two major arguments against imposing postpunitive
incapacitation on the basis of categorical (statistical) prediction.2 1
(1) By imposing such incapacitation we punish for what will or
might be done, not for what has been done. This argument either
fails to distinguish between incapacitation and punishment, despite
the conceptual difference, or, more often, relies on the fact that,
from the viewpoint of the person incapacitated, the difference felt
between punitive incapacitation and preventive incapacitation may
be so small as to be indiscernible. He will feel punished because
he is deprived of liberty by the decision of a social authority. This
point must be granted even if the preventively confined person is

19. See Wolfgang, Crime in a Birth Cohort, 117 PRoc. AM. PHIL. Soc'y 404
(1973).
20. G. NETTLER, EXPLAINING CRIME 99-101 (1974).

21. I deliberately exclude clinical psychiatric prediction, which has been
shown to be unreliable and capricious.
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allowed to live in more pleasant conditions than the punitively confined.
To the legal threat of punishment we may add, for second or
third offenders, a legal threat of incapacitation beyond the punishment. Our purpose may well be preventive. Yet as far as the offender is concerned, the added nonpunitive incapacitation is part of
what was threatened, part, if he so conceives it, of the punishment
threatened. He thus is incapacitated for what he has done, for
committing a second or third offense. Unlike the insane, he is as
able to avoid the threatened incapacitation as he is to avoid the
threatened punishment which precedes it, by avoiding the second
offense. He volunteers for the risk of both punishment and postpunitive incapacitation, and cannot complain if that which he risked
22

occurs.

(2) The more cogent argument against postpunishment incapacitation rests on our limited ability to predict. We can statistically predict that some offenders are more likely to offend again
than others, depending on the category into which they fall. But
our probabilities are no more than that. If not incapacitated,
perhaps a majority of those statistically likely to commit additional
offenses may never actually do so; at least they may never be convicted of other crimes. Statistical predictions can be improved, but
it is unlikely that they will ever approach certainty. Thus, a considerable number of persons might be incapacitated who, if free,
would have done no harm. Yet, they volunteered for that risk by
committing the offenses for which they were convicted.
However, there is a social and moral cost when persons are
incapacitated, who need not be, after they have served the punishment required by their offenses. Against this social cost must
be weighed the social gain produced by incapacitating the offenders
most likely to commit further crimes. The outcome of the calculation is hardly in doubt even if all third offenders had to be perma23
nently incapacitated.
22. The length of postpunishment confinement depends on other factors besides the offense, such as age. This poses no difficulty. Either the threat is varied

according to the age of the offender, or it is so formulated as to make the length of'
postpunishment confinement dependent generally on the statistical likelihood of recidivism.
23. However, this would go far beyond what is suggested by the available data
which indicates that the likelihood crimes will be committed declines rapidly after
the age of 40. See G. NETTLER, supra note 20, at 99-101.
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In war we shoot at enemy soldiers who individually may not
be guilty of anything, not even of being hostile to our country or
cause. Yet we can defend our country and prevent harm to it only
by shooting enemy soldiers who otherwise may shoot us. Social
defense against internal enemies admittedly is different from social
defense against external enemies. For one thing, less is at stake for
the country as a whole. But there are similarities as well. In both
cases we must defend the community against harm by incapacitating both actual and potential enemies. Those who have enlisted in
the criminal army are personally more guilty than those who serve
in the enemy army. Criminals are volunteers; they usually serve no
cause but their own advancement, whereas enemy soldiers usually
are draftees, who do not serve to advance their personal fortunes.
But both criminals and enemy soldiers must be incapacitated as
long as we have reason to believe that they will harm us if free to
do so. Postpunishment incapacitation is among the risks second
offenders volunteer for. It is less of a risk and more easily avoidable
than the risk the draftee runs. I can see no reason why repeated
offenders should not be threatened with that risk. Some further
consequences of the deterrence approach to sentencing will now be
considered.
JUVENILES

Juveniles who have committed acts defined as crimes when
committed by adults, should be tried and sentenced by the same
courts adults are tried by, and under the same laws. If counsel for
the defense wishes to plead diminished capacity for mens rea, or
any other legal excuse or mitigating circumstance, he can do so.
But the law and the court should not assume a priori that the age
24
of juveniles is a mitigating circumstance, let alone a legal excuse.
There is no evidence to indicate that juveniles, owing to their age,
are unaware of the gravity of their offenses or unlikely to be deterred by threats.
Juveniles cannot be deterred, or for that matter rehabilitated,
by promising them immunity from serious punishment, as we have
done hitherto. And they are not less, and often more, socially
25
dangerous than older offenders.
24.

Prisons for various age groups may be separated.

25. Children below the age of 10 should be dealt with by parents and legal
guardians, regardless of offense. The likelihood of full understanding of the wrong-
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DETERMINATE SENTENCES, PAROLE, AND PROBATION

There never was a justification for having sentences secondguessed by nonjudicial personnel. Parole boards know nothing the
sentencing judge could not know, except for some superficial information about the offender's conduct in prison. Such conduct
is not relevant to the punishment to which he has been sentenced in view of the offense; and conduct in prison does not predict future conduct outside prison (which also is irrelevant to
punishment). Hence parole should be abolished. It rests on considerations that, apart from being materially wrong, are irrelevant
under the deterrence criterion. Some credit for good conduct in
prison, given at the discretion of prison authorities, may help
prison discipline and may be useful as long as it does not significantly modify sentences. It should be available, under an established point system, to all prisoners who have not violated prison
rules; but the maximum credit given should not exceed 10% of the
sentence-otherwise indeterminacy would be reintroduced. Deterrence would not be served by sentences that could be greatly reduced by arbitrary and nebulous criteria.
If parole is abolished, long sentences presently threatened and
given in view of the likelihood of parole should be modified by
lessening legal threats. Threats and sentences should be altogether
determinate, leaving judges little discretion. To be deterrent, sentences must be predictable, and the relevant prediction refers to
the time that actually must be served. "Little discretion" may
mean reducing or increasing the legally threatened sentence by
10%. If a judge wishes to go beyond this discretionary variation
because of circumstances deemed exceptional, the prescribed sentence may be increased or decreased by up to 30%, but the sentence must be automatically reviewed by an appeals court empowered to let it stand or to reimpose the sentence threatened for

fulness of their offenses is small. Hence there is little point in legal proceedings.
(Parents and guardians should be civilly liable for harm done by their children.) If
parents or legal guardians abdicate responsibility, whether because of their own disabilities, or because of offenses or misbehavior by the children in their care, the
children should be dealt with exclusively by social agencies other than courts. (This
might also be done for juveniles between 10 and 17 if they are not convicted of
offenses but merely rejected at home.) Preferably, they should be adopted or have
foster parents, or, as a last resort, be kept in nonpunitive boarding schools or institutions. Institutionalized children should be released as soon as that can be done without harm to them or others.
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the offense. 26 When neither seems satisfactory, the appeals court
may ask the lower court to reconsider the sentence. However, unless the discretionary limits are exceeded, sentences should not be
appealable. Giving judges discretion does not adapt the sentence to
the personality of the criminal, as was hoped, but to that of the
judge. Neither adaptation serves the purposes of criminal justice,
and both lead to sentences being perceived as arbitrary and capricious. Hence, discretion should be narrowly limited.
Probation and suspended sentences should be available only to
first offenders for comparatively minor offenses. If judges grant
probation in other circumstances the sentence should be automatically reviewed by a higher court empowered to reject probation.
PRISON SPACE AND PRISON TREATMENT

It is often argued that the sentencing criteria suggested would
increase intolerably the shortage of prison space. Undoubtedly
the increasing severity of sentences which is already occurring requires more prison space than is presently available. Enactment
of the reforms proposed here may require still more. How much
additional prison space will be required permanently is hard to
predict. If more severe and frequent prison sentences are given, a
higher proportion of offenders will be in prison. But if these sentences deter, fewer offenses will be committed. 2 7 Thus the total
number of offenders will decrease and the actual prison population
ultimately may not increase much.
Yet, at least temporarily, more prisons will have to be built. It
has been argued that this will be too costly. However, it is cheaper
to build prisons than to tolerate a higher crime rate, even though
taxpayers rather than crime victims may have to bear the cost. At
any rate, the cost of imprisonment is far higher than it need be for
three reasons apart from waste and corruption.
(1) Fairly costly attempts are made to provide prisoners with
rehabilitative services and various amenities which have never
been shown to contribute to any of the purposes of punishment,
including rehabilitation. Television is not required as part of
26. Thus, if the law prescribes a sentence of 10 years, the court, within its discretion, may impose a sentence of anywhere between nine and 11 years without review of the sentence. If the court, explaining the exceptional circumstances that lead
to its decision, increases the sentence to 13 years or decreases it to seven years, an
automatic review follows.
27. The lengthier and more frequent incapacitation of habitual offenders will
add to that effect.
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humane treatment or rehabilitation; nor is tennis, or conjugal sex.28
A prisoner is intentionally severed from his normal environment
and from amenities. There is no reason to provide either at government expense. If his normal environment were helpful in producing lawful behavior, he probably would not be in prison. There
is no evidence showing that television, sex, or tennis help rehabilitation either.
(2) Prisoners are not given productive work and they are not
allowed to earn enough to pay for their keep. Most legal experts
are in favor, as I am, of normal wages and work opportunities for
prisoners, and of incentive pay. Even nonmonetary work incentives, such as shortening of sentences according to work performed
are not altogether inconsistent with deterrent punishment, if kept
within narrow limits. 29 I will not dwell on this matter. Obstacles
come from labor unions and business; the problem is political. But
it must be noted that prisons are costly only because we insist on
making them costly. They could be self-supporting and, if prisoners
become taxpayers, they could increase government revenue. Lawful work at normal wages within prisons may even be rehabilitative. It is one "treatment" that has never been tried.
(3) The most costly part of imprisonment consists of the measures taken to prevent escape. These measures also raise prison
building costs. However, many inmates are neither violent nor
prone to escape. They may have surrendered voluntarily and may
prefer to serve their time rather than to add to their crimes by
escaping and living as fugitives. Accordingly, we should create
small prisons with minimal supervision: no more security is needed
than is provided in a factory. Roll calls will be needed-but no
actual measures to prevent flight. In doubtful cases prisoners working in these prisons may provide bonds, forfeited if they escape.
In other cases this may be unnecessary. If only actual security
risks-violent or escape-prone prisoners (a category which may include all young offenders sentenced to long terms)-are kept in
high security prisons, imprisonment will become much cheaper
than it is now.
Those who most lament prison crowding and wax eloquently
about the inhumane conditions it creates are often the very persons
28. The absence of sexual gratification, although unpopular, has never been
shown to be harmful, romantic psychologists to the contrary notwithstanding.
29. Appropriate deductions from pay for room and board and for court ordered compensation of parties harmed will have to be made.
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who did their best, for ideological reasons, to prevent the building
of additional prisons. They have helped create the conditions which
they now use to insist that offenders should not be confined as
often or as long as is needed to protect the community. Most of
them persist in opposing the building of prisons and I have found it
impossible to rehabilitate them.
CONCLUSION

Deterrence is the only criterion needed to justify threats and
the infliction of punishment. Deterrence also justifies and determines the length of sentences and their distribution. Both deterrence and retribution require the distribution of punishment to the
guilty, although for different reasons; neither rehabilitation nor retribution is needed as justification or as sentencing criterion. Furthermore, in specific cases, postpunitive incapacitation is justifiable as a measure of (nonpunitive) social defense.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol7/iss1/7

16

